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Abstract
Modern information and communication technologies (ICTs) have been heralded as a
key enabler of more integrated, flexible, network forms of organising. In this paper we
critically examine such claims by drawing on evidence from a longitudinal, interpretive
study of the strategic use of IT within the Irish credit union movement. While various
economic and technological factors had contributed to the emergence of an impetus for
organisational reform and modernisation in some quarters, the realisation of such
changes was complicated by historically-constituted contradictions and ideological
differences. IT, however, appeared to offer a relatively painless solution to such
problems by promising the prospect of significant organisational change without
substantial reform. Here, we argue that the allure of unproblematic and flexible ITenabled organisational integration encouraged credit unions to embark on a disastrous
implementation effort while conveniently ignoring fundamental contradictions within the
movement. Interestingly, while the implementation attempt was unanimously regarded as
a costly failure, the process associated with its development and demise brought the
contentious issue of reform to a head. The result seems likely to be a significant
transformation in the organisation of the movement. Paradoxically, the failure of the
strategic implementation effort triggered this transformation by accident rather than by
design.
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1. Introduction
In recent years there has been much speculation about, and interest in, the potential of
new ICTs to facilitate novel and more flexible ways of organising business activities
(Davidow and Malone, 1992; Byrne, 1993). It has been suggested that geographicallydistributed corporations can employ such technologies to achieve much higher levels of
global integration (with associated economies of scale) while retaining significant local
autonomy and flexibility (Lipnack and Stamps, 1996; 1997). This is an alluring vision of
organisational transformation because it suggests that organisations can reap the benefits
of integration without surrendering flexibility. Unfortunately, however, much of this
discussion has tended to take the form of theoretical speculation, with very few reports of
in-depth empirical studies that can be drawn upon to substantiate such claims. Moreover,
the theoretical discussion couches these problems predominantly in technical terms, with
little emphasis on attendant social, political and historical issues (Knights and Willmott,
1999). An examination of empirical evidence would appear to be highly pertinent, then,
given the many examples in the IS literature of failed implementation attempts or
contradictory outcomes (Robey and Boudreau, 1999).
In this paper we present a detailed account of an unsuccessful attempt by the Irish League
of Credit Unions (ILCU) to deploy IT as a means of facilitating a move to a more
networked form of organising. The ILCUTECH Standard Information System (ISIS)
project was intended to provide a centralised, standard banking system that would enable
all credit unions to offer an expanded range of financial services to their members. ISIS
never progressed beyond pilot testing and was abandoned in 2001 following severe
budget and schedule overruns. As a result of the project’s collapse, a split has developed
in the ILCU; several of the larger credit unions have left the organisation and are
considering setting up an alternative umbrella group. We argue that one of the key
problems was that, in their enthusiasm to embrace such an alluring technological solution
to specific organisational problems, the credit union movement neglected more deepseated issues that were previously largely ignored or unarticulated. These issues went
right to the core of the values of the movement. Thus, what was initially seen as largely a
technical problem turned out to be much more fundamental and deeply rooted.
The paper begins with a brief description of the research design. The first section of the
case description offers a historical overview of the Irish credit union movement that
illustrates the ethos of mutual self-help and voluntary work, while the second part
describes the failed ISIS project and outlines the developments that have occurred since
the project’s demise. In the analysis, we use the concept of organisational archetypes
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1993; Cooper et al, 1996) to illustrate how the failed
implementation crystallised pre-existing divisions within the credit union movement that
had previously lain dormant. This unintended consequence suggests that the failed project
facilitated organisational transformation within the movement, but that, paradoxically, the
changes were achieved by accident rather than design. We conclude by emphasising that
the creation of new organisational forms should not be seen as primarily a technical
matter, but one that that involves key social, organisational and political issues.
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2. Research Design
The research is part of an ongoing, interpretive, longitudinal study (1999 – present) into
the use of technology within the ILCU, with particular attention given to the failed ISIS
Project (1998-2001). Primary data were collected from unstructured interviews with a
range of people involved in the credit union movement (see Dangerfield, 1999; Mangan,
2000). The sampling strategy involved interviewing as wide a range of stakeholders as
possible, including ordinary members, officers and managers of individual credit unions,
the President and Vice-President of the ILCU, members of the project team (including the
project manager), the Credit Union Advisory Committee (which reports to the Irish
Government), as well as two of the external IT suppliers. In total, senior people from
eighteen credit unions were interviewed during the course of the research, with six people
interviewed more than once. The respondents were evenly split between the opponents
and proponents of the project.
Sources of secondary data included media reports, public and confidential internal
documents (including minutes of meetings, annual reports, accounts, specially
commission consultants reports), Government white papers and legislation. While credit
union personnel provided some of this documentation, the majority of the secondary data
was collected independently.

3. Case description
3.1 The Irish Credit Union Movement
The Irish credit union movement originated in Dublin during the 1950s. At a time of high
interest rates in Ireland, the founders were interested in offering an alternative to hirepurchase credit and illegal moneylenders (Quinn, 1999; Culloty, 1990). The first two
credit unions opened in 1958 and enthusiasm for the movement grew rapidly. Based on
the Credit Union Acts, 1966 and 1997, each credit union is independently run on a nonprofit basis and can offer savings and loan facilities to its members. Since its inception,
the movement has played an important role in Irish society, achieving widespread
recognition and popularity. The most recent figures show that by December 1999, there
were 438 registered credit unions in the Republic of Ireland, with just over 2 million
members and assets of approximately EUR5 billion (Sisk, 2001).
Despite the legal autonomy of each credit union, the founders also created a centralised
administrative organisation that operates alongside the individual credit unions, offering training
and support services for its affiliated members. This organisation, now known as the ILCU, was
created in 1960 and the first set of standard rules for credit unions were adopted at its inaugural
Annual General Meeting (AGM) in 1961. Like the individual credit unions, this body was
organised on a voluntary basis from the outset; the first secretary of the league performed and
paid for all the administrative work and also allowed her home to serve as the league’s office
until 1969, when the credit union headquarters moved to its own premises.

From these modest beginnings, the ILCU has grown alongside the credit unions. The
ILCU is a non-statutory body with full time administrative and technical staff. The Board
of Directors, however, is comprised solely of voluntary officers. Membership of the
ILCU is voluntary and credit unions become affiliated members when they accept and
adopt the Standard Rules for Credit Unions (ILCU, 1998). Central to the ILCU’s
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understanding of co-operative principles are the core values of equality, equity and
mutual self-help. In practice, these are reflected in the promotion of the league’s
governance structure, service to members and the concept of social responsibility.
Traditionally the movement was organised by small groups of volunteers who ran the
credit union offices in a variety of borrowed locations such as parish halls and school
buildings. None of the officers received payment for this work and many of the credit
unions only opened for a couple of hours per week. More recently, with the growth in
popularity of the movement, many of the credit unions have begun to organise
themselves on a more professional basis. There has been a move to build bespoke credit
union premises, full-time counter staff and mangers have been hired, business hours are
kept, and, although the Boards of Directors still comprise of voluntary officers, more
emphasis is being placed on the professional management of each credit union.

3.2. The ISIS Project
In the late 1990s, the ILCU turned to IT in an attempt to dramatically transform the
organisational structure of the league. They wished to maintain the credit unions’
autonomous, decentralised status while simultaneously reaping the benefits of increased
integration. Due to the fractured nature of the credit union movement, the IS selection
process was highly decentralised, with each credit union responsible for sourcing their
own hardware and software. By the late 1990s, there were approximately 450 computer
installations, comprised of at least 33 different software systems serviced by 26 suppliers,
as well as several smaller credit unions that updated their accounts manually
(ILCUTECH, 2000). It was felt that because there was no common interface between the
systems, this produced operational inefficiencies making economies of scale impossible.
Furthermore, the credit unions had become overly dependent on individual suppliers; in
1997 and 1998 two significant suppliers withdrew their services from credit unions.
Additional impetus to adopt a networked IS solution was created by several external
factors. In particular, the competitive landscape had changed significantly since the
founding of the movement, with some of the most significant change having only come
about relatively recently. The revised Credit Union Act, 1997 and the impending Single
Regulatory Authority meant that credit unions would be required to produce strictly
audited accounts. Falling interest rates meant that margins were falling. In addition, the
lower interest rates have made retail banks more competitive and have forced them to
target market segments such as holiday and car loans; these areas were traditionally the
preserve of the credit unions. Similarly, new players in the financial services
marketplace, such as the supermarkets, are targeting the credit union membership base
and threatening to saturate the market. Finally, new financial services are emerging.
Many of these are facilitated by developments in IT and include ATMs, direct debits,
credit and laser cards, telephone and Internet banking.
The ISIS project was initiated in order to create a centralised banking system for all credit
unions affiliated to the ILCU. The system was conceived as a tool to enable all credit
unions to offer a full range of financial products and services to their members, thus
bringing the movement in line with marketplace trends and complying with the increased
regulatory requirements. With ISIS, credit unions could offer services such as electronic
fund transfers, ATM and debit cards. Furthermore, ISIS would remove dependence on
suppliers because it was owned and managed by the credit union movement. A key
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feature of the system was that it would be flexible enough to cater to the needs of all
credit unions, irrespective of their size and the systems already in use, thus allowing each
credit union to preserve its decentralised, legally independent status while concurrently
organising in a more networked fashion. The allure of ISIS as a technological solution is
illustrated by the ILCU President’s speech at the 2000 AGM:
I have no doubt that the long-term viability of this movement depends, to a large degree,
on the success of ISIS. . . . The real question remains, as it always has been, ‘can we
afford not to have it?’ (ILCU, 2000).
ILCUTECH, the technology arm of the ILCU, hired a British financial services
consultancy to develop the ISIS proposal in July 1998. The consultants initially estimated
that the project would cost EUR50 million. By March 1999, ILCUTECH had raised
almost EUR22 million, a figure that represented a 74.36% commitment to the project
(ILCUTECH, 2000). For the remainder of 1999, ILCUTECH and the consultants
concentrated on selecting a software supplier, sourcing a managed service provider,
establishing criteria for the pilot sites and selecting which credit unions should be used to
test ISIS. In October 1999, the Board of ILCUTECH were informed that the project was
on schedule and within budget. When an initial project review was conducted in January
2000, however, a cost overrun was revealed. At the ILCU’s AGM in April 2000, the
credit unions were informed that the initial proposal underestimated the cost of ISIS and
the project was now expected to cost EUR87 million instead of EUR50 million. To make
matters worse, progress on the implementation phase of the project was slower than
originally planned.
The project’s operational and financial difficulties provoked tension in the movement as
individual credit unions expressed anger, disbelief and disappointment about the findings.
Opinion was divided over who was responsible for the project’s difficulty. A member of
the Credit Union Advisory Committee suggested that the ILCU tried to pin responsibility
on the consultants and that it was ‘typical of democratic, voluntary organisations that they
would try to create scapegoats rather than accepting blame themselves’. Some of the
credit union managers interviewed cited poor communication (‘the ILCU offers a
dressed-up, shop window version of what they are doing’), ‘ludicrous’ financial estimates
and ‘impossible logistics’. A senior member of the ISIS project team pointed to the
ILCUTECH board’s lack of expertise:
A major problem with the project is that at the start they went to consultants to do all the
work, instead of hiring an IT manager with good experience in the Irish market. They
should have also hired an Irish project manager who would understand the special needs
of the movement. By not having staff at the beginning, huge funds were eaten up by
hiring consultants.
There was no-one within the movement who championed the project and took sole
responsibility for it; responsibility was diffused between the consultants, the Boards of
ILCUTECH and the ILCU, as well as the project team (Mangan and Stahl, 2002). What
is clear is that ISIS was poorly managed from the start: the finances were not doublechecked; officers on the Board of Directors had no experience of IT project management;
and, finally, widely diffused responsibility meant, in effect, that the project was managed
by a committee that operated in a ‘very fractured way’ (Beesley, 2002).
As a result, the ILCU was forced to convene a Special General Meeting (SGM) on 8-9
July, 2000 in order to discuss the future of the project. In advance of the SGM, nineteen
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of the larger credit unions in Ireland sent a letter to the Registrar of Friendly Societies and
every credit union in the country outlining their concern about the developments in the
project and what they understood to be the misuse of ILCU funds. Nevertheless, it was
decided at the SGM to commit an extra EUR2.5 million in order to carry out a ‘root and
branch’ review of the project. Following this review, the ILCU held another SGM in
February 2001 at which it was decided to terminate the ISIS project. Since the project’s
collapse, several of the larger credit unions have left the ILCU and are considering setting
up an alternative umbrella organisation that will cater to their specific needs.
The spectacular failure of ISIS has had several consequences for the ILCU, many of them
unintended. Confidence in the movement’s ability to implement a large-scale project has
been eroded and, after years of favourable coverage, the media has become consistently
critical of the movement. Although many within the movement still see the ‘vital
necessity’ of providing a technological solution for the credit unions as a whole, the
collapse of ISIS has had the unintended consequence that rather than uniting the credit
unions and allowing them to leverage economies of scale in a network fashion, there is
now a pronounced schism in the movement. Some of the larger credit unions have finally
decided to leave the ILCU and are considering setting-up an alternative alliance
incorporating different governance structures.

4. Analysis
In order to explain the reasons underlying the project’s failure, and its attendant
consequences, it is illuminating to examine the tensions and contradictions that had
developed within the movement over a period of many years. The notion of an
‘organisational archetype’ is a useful conceptual device for these purposes. An archetype
can be defined as ‘a set of structures and systems that reflects a single interpretive
scheme’ (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993, p. 1052). Organisations attempt to produce
‘archetypal coherence’ (ibid, p. 1056) and, predicated on the existence of several
archetypes that vie for limited organisational resources, the dominant archetype will
safeguard its position by resisting any change to the status quo. From this it can be
inferred that organisations will tend towards one predominant archetype and will exhibit
inertia and conservatism when faced with change. Furthermore, the clash between
archetypes can be understood using a metaphor of sedimentation (Cooper et al, 1996) to
illustrate the protracted process of change whereby elements of both archetypes continue
to co-exist within the new structure. This posits change as a gradual process; instead of
experiencing organisational transformation as a direct, straightforward progress from one
state to another, the archetypes are layered over each other, creating a hybrid that
includes elements of both. This hybrid creates fault lines that cause gradual erosions as
well as dramatic upheavals to the organisation’s structure.
Within the credit union movement the dominant archetype could be captured by the
notion of ‘ethical community service’. This archetype is based on the movement’s
traditional values of
community-focused social responsibility and voluntary work,
specifically manifesting itself in the idea of the ‘gentleman amateur’ and a governance
structure that relies on committees and voluntary officers. The constituent offices are
highly autonomous, creating a decentralised, diffused power structure that makes
implementation of large-scale change difficult. In contrast, ongoing institutional and
market changes have contributed to the emergence of a more recent archetype,
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‘professional management’, that focuses on growth, hierarchical responsibility and
generating value for individual customers. This archetype is predominantly comprised of
larger credit unions that have significant savings to invest on their members’ behalf. They
advocate running credit unions as a business and emphasise their knowledge and use of
strategy, marketing and accountancy. Because the broader movement did not impinge
directly on most of the activities of the autonomous, individual credit unions, both
archetypes continued to co-exist and differences were tolerated until the emergence and
subsequent failure of the ISIS project.
The primary difference between the traditional and reforming archetypes centres on the
question of governance structures; the emphasis within the movement from the beginning
was on community-service and this is reflected in the voting structure, which allows
equal votes to both large and small credit unions. The larger credit unions have argued
that the voting structure leads to political manoeuvring and partiality within the ILCU as
representatives of smaller credit unions dominate the Board of Directors. One delegate at
the ISIS SGM argued that the voting structure was ‘just plain misguided’. In his view, the
ILCU Board are concerned with re-election and, because of the significant number of
votes held by smaller credit unions, the ILCU concentrates on the needs of the small
offices and largely neglects those of the larger ones. As some unions grew very large,
their members began to feel a sense of injustice with regard to what they perceived to be
a democratic deficit within the movement; credit unions with far fewer members could
exercise just as much influence. This argument reflects a wider debate regarding the
equality of each community as opposed to the equality of each member and has been
provoked by the principles of co-operation among co-operatives and social responsibility,
both of which are central to the ethical community service archetype. Social
responsibility describes a vision of social justice whereby credit unions strive for human
and social development through their attention to both members and the wider
community in which these members live. Co-operation stresses the need for all credit
unions to act together for the greater good, rather than promoting an individual credit
union’s needs. These concepts are in direct conflict with the reforming archetype; some
of the very large credit unions have argued that their primary responsibility is towards
their members rather than the movement as a whole. A founder member of one of the
largest credit unions suggested that a wide definition of community represented ‘a type of
Robin Hood attitude to the movement’ because the large credit unions are financing the
ILCU but that ‘the League is looking after the small ones but not the large’. In contrast to
this, the current president of the ILCU is adamant that all credit unions have to unite and
act together. He argues that the larger credit unions may be able to compete effectively
with other financial institutions within the area of their common bond, but that does not
guarantee their ability to compete on a national or international level. In an interview
published shortly after his election, he stated that:
‘many people within the credit union movement have felt a sense of alienation for
sometime. This was exacerbated by the ISIS debacle. There has been a lack of unity and
focus in the movement’ (ILCU, 2002).
As he understands it, the credit unions have lost the ‘unity of purpose’ that was present in
the early years of the movement.
The conflict between the archetypes of ethical community service and professional
management had particular resonance during the ISIS project. For example, several
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managers of larger credit unions argued that per-member costing for the project meant
large credit unions were contributing the majority of the finance for ISIS and that this
represented bad value for money for their members. Conversely, other respondents
suggested that ISIS was the only means of responding to the emerging market challenges
as a collective. One manager of a medium-sized credit union pointed to the world-wide
slogan ‘Not for Charity, Not for Profit, But for Service’ and argued that ISIS was the only
means by which all credit unions could maintain their focus on traditional service without
becoming ‘like a bank’.
The question regarding the movement’s ‘unity of purpose’ goes to the heart of the
controversy over the ISIS debacle. The credit union movement was experiencing tensions
between the need to become more integrated (thereby offering improved service to
members and gaining economies of scale) while simultaneously retaining the traditional
local autonomy. The ILCU was attracted by the potential of IT to facilitate greater
integration without threatening the valued autonomy and flexibility of individual credit
unions and decided that ISIS represented an ideal solution that could deliver significant
benefits to the movement as a whole. Thus, they hoped that the conflicting archetypes
and fractured nature of the movement could be ignored. The allure of unproblematic ITenabled transformation led them to believe that they could reap the benefits of increased
integration without any significant organisational change. They discovered to their cost,
however, that moving to a networked form of organising was more difficult than it
appeared. The implementation of such changes turned out to be a much more complex
task than they initially envisaged as the ILCU’s diffused governance structure meant that
the project was badly managed, strong leadership was absent and the project lacked a
well-defined locus of responsibility. Paradoxically, it appeared that the realisation of an
integrated network form depended on the existence of much stronger, centralised
governance mechanisms as well as an overall unity of purpose, both of which were
problematised by the peculiar historical development of the movement.
Ironically, it is the failure of ISIS, rather than its success, that has heralded one of the
most significant changes since the movement’s foundation. Some of the larger, reforming
credit unions had suspended their own IT plans in order to maintain the movement’s
unity during the ISIS project. The difficulties experienced during the project, however,
not only convinced them that the traditional and reforming archetypes are incompatible,
but that their members would be better served by withdrawing from the ILCU. Thus, the
spectacular nature of the project’s failure was the decisive event which encouraged these
credit unions to disaffiliate from the ILCU and they are now discussing the creation of
their own separate administrative body.

5. Conclusions and implications
The ILCU’s experience with the ISIS project raises a number of important issues in
relation to the role of IT in the facilitation of a move to more integrated, flexible,
networked forms of organising. For one thing there is a need to question the extent to
which such transformations are possible in contexts where authority is widely dispersed.
One of the key problems in the ISIS project was the absence of a strong centralised
authority structure to push the initiative through. This is one of the paradoxes of the case
because it suggests that the facilitation of such decentralised, flexible network forms can
depend on the existence of strong centralised governance structures that can agree and
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enforce necessary changes such as standardisation of work practices or agreements
between third-party suppliers. In turn, the successful implementation of such new
practices may depend on agreement regarding an organisation’s core values and direction
(for example, whether to remain community-focused or become customer-focused).
We have suggested, then, that the credit unions were fooled by the false promise of a
quick technical fix to resolve deeply entrenched organisational problems. They failed to
realise that the creation of new organisational forms is not purely a technical matter, but
that there are also significant organisational issues to consider. Having failed to confront
their complex and contradictory organisational structures, they were undone by that very
complexity. The case illustrates the allure, yet the inherent lack of sophistication, of
popular discourses about the relationship between IT and organisational transformation
that frame the problem largely in technical terms, thus overlooking important historical,
social and political issues.
A final paradox implicit in this case is that rather than the IT being the facilitator of
organisational transformation in a direct fashion, the process was much more indirect
although the change no less significant. Here it was the spectacular nature of the failure
of the system that crystallised the important tensions between two world-views that had
co-existed within the movement for some time. This acted as an unintentional trigger
that provoked very direct action that seems likely to fundamentally transform the
movement; in the wake of the failure of ISIS, several of the key credit unions have left
the ILCU to set up alliances of their own. This final, unexpected outcome underlines the
complexity of the relationship between IT and organisational change.
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